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RECAP; Letica Land Company, LLC v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County: An Uphill Road to Defeat the Standard of Review   
Brian Geer No. DA 14-0780 
 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, September 16th, 2015, at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, located in the Joseph P. 
Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
I. MARTIN KING FOR APPELLANT LETICA LAND COMPANY 
 
Mr. King opened his argument by characterizing this case as an 
unconstitutional taking of private property rather than a public access 
case. Mr. King set out a clear, confident layout of his argument and 
identified issues which he could quickly dismiss. He wanted the Court to 
know the background of the “roads” (a term he used loosely) at issue. He 
stated the lower branch is an underused, unkempt road which was never 
the sole or even primary access to the above lakes, and the upper road is 
a simple mountain trail, neither of which have ever been formally called 
“Modesty Creek” roads. 
Getting into the bulk of his argument, Mr. King addressed the 
1889 petition, which declared the lower branch a road, as well as the 
petition’s dependence on the road-creation statute requiring county 
action in furtherance of the road. When questioned, Mr. King seemingly 
conceded that the County had done maintenance on the road, but 
clarified that the maintenance was minimal, ceased completely after 
1965, and was always done at the request of a landowner which, he 
argued, did not fulfil the statutory condition. 
The Justices then quickly moved on and asked questions 
regarding the payment for the road and which party bore the burden of 
proving whether or not the road was paid for. Mr. King argued the statute 
required that the expenses of the road be paid by the county because the 
Commissioners deliberately referenced said statute in the petition. 
Further, Mr. King stated the County did not produce any records 
showing that the road was paid for. Justice Cotter asked whether the 
County was required to provide proof of payment, referring to Powell 
County v. 5 Rockin’ MS Angus Ranch.1 Mr. King distinguished his 
argument from the holding in 5 Rockin’ because the parties in that case 
stipulated it was a public road. Absent such a stipulation, he argued that 
the County is required to show at least some documentation confirming it 
                                           
1 Powell County v. Rockin’ MS Angus Ranch, 102 P.3d 1210 (Mont. 2004). 
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paid for the road pursuant to the statute. Mr. King argued that affirming 
the district court’s order would force the landowner to prove a negative 
when this burden should rest with the party arguing the existence of the 
road. 
The questions regarding the upper branch focused on whether or 
not there was evidence of adverse use. Mr. King pointed out that the 
landowners had erected three gates, no trespassing signs, a berm, and had 
put out a newspaper article alerting the public that the road was private. 
Mr. King further argued that the statute allows reverse prescription by 
contrary action or nonuse by the public, and that both were met.2 
 
II. MARK STERMITZ FOR APPELLANT DON MCGEE 
 
Mr. Stermitz dedicated his argument to the upper branch and the 
district court’s confused and misinterpreted analysis of the prescriptive 
easement. He argued that the district court’s ruling, if upheld, would 
create bad precedent for future cases because it would allow future courts 
to make disingenuous and expansive interpretations of the record taken 
as a whole. According to Mr. Stermitz, the district court relied on 
indiscriminate evidence in proving the elements of an easement and 
inconsistently relied on maps to prove what it wanted to prove. He 
seemed concerned that courts and also title companies would be able to 
use an incomplete record to make its decisions, which would severely 
disadvantage landowners. The Justices seized upon this, stating that all 
easement cases are fact-based and that previous case law looked at a 
variety of sources to determine the record as a whole. Ultimately, the 
Court looked to Mr. Stermitz to define what he thought should be the 
standard should be.  
 
III. CYNTHIA WALKER FOR APPELLEE ANACONDA-DEER LODGE 
COUNTY 
 
Ms. Walker’s straightforward and brief argument also began by 
addressing the 1889 petition and stated the road was unconditionally 
declared a road and that the expenses would be borne by the owners, not 
the County. Furthermore, she argued there was no evidence that the 
County didn’t pay for it, nor was there evidence that the road required 
any expense since it already existed. 
While the district court did consider the 1913 map in its decision, 
Ms. Walker pointed out that the other maps which Mr. King and Mr. 
Stermitz refer to were not introduced into evidence and therefore were 
not considered in the record as a whole. She also argued that the portion 
of the 1896 map which Mr. King argued showed the terminus of the 
                                           
2 Mont. Code Ann. § 70–17–111 (2013). 
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lower branch was unsurveyed and not to scale. It would therefore be 
inappropriate for the district court to have extrapolated beyond the 
surveyed portion of the map and was justified in its use of other 
evidence, including testimony, to determine where the lower branch 
ended. 
Ms. Walker added that Appellants had not met the “clearly 
erroneous” standard of review for a district court’s Findings of Fact. 
While the appellants argued that the district court had misinterpreted or 
ignored much of the record, she pointed out that the district court not 
only wrote a 74-page order but also conducted a site visit to the property.  
Moving on to the upper branch, Ms. Walker challenged whether the use 
of the land was actually restricted by Appellants. Before 1980, Ms. 
Walker stated that the public frequently used the land to access lakes, 
both for water rights and recreation, and that the Forest Service 
frequented the roads as well. Furthermore, Ms. Walker asserted the 
appellants failed to prove that their actions interrupted the public use by 
clear and convincing evidence. She contended that the gates were locked 
for one to two years at the most, that the locked gates were on the lower 
branch, and that both Appellant McGee and the non-party owner 
Launderville testified that people were cutting the fences to access the 
land.  
 Finally, Ms. Walker returned to the issue of the 1889 petition 
meeting and addressed questions regarding how this decision aligns with 
precedent. Ms. Walker affirmed that this petition met the same standards 
as 5 Rockin’ and should similarly be upheld. Additionally, case law 
supports her position that it is nearly impossible for the County to 
produce all evidence relating to a petition from over one hundred years 
ago.3 Thus, it would be unfair to force the County to produce these 
records when it argues the minutes of the petition clearly state that the 
County declared it a road and the other party cannot produce contrary 
evidence. 
 
IV. MARTIN KING’S REBUTTAL 
 
During his brief rebuttal, Mr. King swiftly moved through his 
last few arguments. Notably, he wanted to touch on the County’s one 
hundred years of non-recognition of the lower branch as well as his 
dispute as to its terminus. He also challenged Ms. Walker’s argument 
regarding the upper branch by stating that the County did not contest the 
elements of reverse prescription. 
Although he mentioned it in his opening statement, Mr. King 
again stated the district court ignored the fact that the 1913 county map 
and every subsequent map did not depict the lower branch. Additionally, 
                                           
3 Reid v. Park County, 627 P.2d 1210 (Mont. 1981).  
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the maps that did recognize the road depicted it ending on the eastern 
edge of Section 23 and not Section 22 as the County claimed. Mr. King 
argued the district court relied on hearsay and anecdotal evidence to 
extend the road another mile to Section 22 just so the County could 
connect the lower branch to the upper branch.   
Finally, Mr. King brought up that nowhere in the County’s argument 
did it state that the elements of a reverse prescription were not met, but 
that the County instead argued Appellant Letica illegally blocked the 
road. Mr. King contended, however, that the statute simply holds the use 
be continually interrupted for over five years to eliminate the easement. 
The Court noted that Letica had purchased the land nine years after the 
gates were locked and seemed hesitant to allow a person to rely on 
reverse prescription, however, when it was someone else’s action which 




This case centers on the conflict between landowner’s right to 
private use and the public policy regarding effective use of land. As 
evidenced by the district court’s lengthy order as well as each party’s 
extensive briefing, this case is fact-intensive and it will be difficult to 
determine which way the Court will side. It is also possible that the Court 
will rule on the lower branch and upper branch separately. Ultimately, 
the Court will likely uphold the ruling of the district court because the 
standard of review weighs heavily against the appellants. 
With respect to the lower branch, the central issue the Court 
addressed was the relevance of the statute and whether or not the County 
was required to show that it funded the road. The Court was not 
concerned with the district court’s interpretation of the record taken as a 
whole, even though it was a significant part of Appellants’ argument. 
Appellants argued that the district court improperly considered the record 
but did not state what they felt the record as a whole should be. 
Furthermore, while Appellants argued that the County could not produce 
evidence that they had paid for the road, several Justices challenged 
whether or not the appellants had any evidence that the County did not 
pay for the road. One Justice suggested that the Commissioners of the 
1889 meeting may have even waived this requirement in the petition. 
Regardless, the Court seemed troubled with the idea of forcing a County 
to come up with the entirety of the record to prove the existence of a road 
which already has a history of maintenance by the County and use by the 
public.  
As for the upper branch, the Court seemed to believe there was a 
prescriptive easement and was mostly concerned with the issue of 
reverse prescription. Here the appellants may have a more favorable 
argument. Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness, and Mr. 
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King’s rebuttal focused heavily on the statutory definition of reverse 
prescription which he argued exterminated prescription. When 
questioned, Ms. Walker said that the appellants did not actually prevent 
the use for statutory time, but this factual argument may not convince the 
Court. Because the standard of review is more lenient to Conclusions of 
Law, it is possible, but not probable, that the Court may reverse or 
remand the district court’s holding on the upper branch. 
As Ms. Walker frequently pointed out, the standard of review 
rests heavily against the appellants. During the week-long trial, the 
district court heard many witnesses, conducted a site view, and issued a 
lengthy final opinion.  All these facts favor the County and give the 
Court little room to find for the appellants. The Court seemed 
unconvinced that Appellants’ arguments overcame the standard of 
review and will likely affirm the district court’s imperfect but thorough 
review of the record.    
